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Abstract
We consider the problem of how decision making can be
fair when the underlying probabilistic model of the world
is not known with certainty. We argue that recent notions
of fairness in machine learning need to explicitly incorpo-
rate parameter uncertainty, hence we introduce the notion
of Bayesian fairness as a suitable candidate for fair deci-
sion rules. Using balance, a definition of fairness introduced
in [Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 2016], we show
how a Bayesian perspective can lead to well-performing and
fair decision rules even under high uncertainty.
Introduction
Fairness is a desirable property of policies applied to a
population of individuals. For example, college admissions
should be decided on variables that inform about merit, but
fairness may also require taking into account the fact that cer-
tain communities are inherently disadvantaged. At the same
time, a person should not feel that another in a similar sit-
uation obtained an unfair advantage. All this must be taken
into account while still optimizing a decision maker’s utility
function.
Much of the recent work on fairness in machine learning
has focused on analysing sometimes conflicting definitions.
In this paper we do not focus on proposing new definitions or
algorithms.We instead take a closer look at informational as-
pects of fairness. In particular, by adopting a Bayesian view-
point, we can explicitly take into account model uncertainty,
something that turns out to be crucial for fairness.
Uncertainty about the underlying reality has two main ef-
fects. Firstly, most notions of fairness are defined with re-
spect to some latent variables, including model parameters.
This means that we need to take into account uncertainty in
order to be fair. Secondly, in many problems our decisions
determine what data we will collect in the future. Ignoring
uncertainty may magnify subtle biases in our model.
By viewing fairness through a Bayesian decision theo-
retic perspective, we avoid these problems. In particular, we
demonstrate that Bayesian policies can optimally trade off
utility and fairness by explicitly taking into account uncer-
tainty about model parameters.
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We consider a setting where a decision maker (DM)
makes a sequence of decisions through some chosen policy
π to maximise her expected utility u. However, the DMmust
trade off utility with some fairness constraint f . We assume
the existence of some underlying probability law P , so that
the decision problem, when P is known, can be written as:
max
π
(1 − λ)EπP u− λE
π
P f, (1)
where λ is the DM’s trade-off between fairness and utility.1
In this paper we adopt a Bayesian viewpoint and assume
the DM has some belief β over some family of distributions
P , {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ }, which may contain the actual law, i.e.
Pθ∗ = P for some θ
∗.
The DM’s policy π defines what actions at ∈ A the
DM takes at different (discrete) times t depending on the
available information. More precisely, at time t the DM ob-
serves some data xt ∈ X , and depending on her belief
βt makes a decision at ∈ A, so that π(at | βt, xt) de-
fines a probability over actions for every possible belief
and observation. The DM’s objective is to maximize her ex-
pected utility. We model this as a function with structure
u : A × Y → R, where Y is a set of outcomes. The fair-
ness concept we focus on in this paper is a Bayesian version
of balance [Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 2016],
which depends on the policy at time t. In the Bayesian set-
ting, information is central. The amount of uncertainty about
the model parameters directly influences how fairness can be
achieved. Informally, the more uncertain we are, the more
stochastic the decision rule is.
Our contributions. In this paper, we develop a frame-
work for fairness that is defined as being appropriate to
the available information for the DM. The motivation
for the Bayesian framework is that there can be a high
degree of uncertainty, particularly when not a lot of data
has been collected, or in sequential settings. This infor-
mational notion of fairness is central to our discussion. It
entails that the DM should take into account how unfair
she would be under all possible models, weighted by
their probability. While the fairness concepts we use are
1We do not consider the alternative constrained problem i.e.
max {EpiP u | E
pi
P f ≤ ǫ }, in the present paper.
grounded in conditional independence [Chouldechova,
2016; Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 2016;
Hardt, Price, and Srebro, 2016] type of notions of fairness,
we employ a Bayesian decision theoretic methodology. In
particular, we cleanly separate model parameters from the
DM’s information, and the decision rule used by the DM.
Fairness can thus be seen as a property of the decision rule
with respect to the true model (which is used to measure
fairness), while achieving it depends on the DM’s informa-
tion (which is used to derive algorithms). The Bayesian
approach we adopt for fair decision making is generally
applicable. In this paper, however, we focus on a simple
setting so that we can work without model approximations,
and proceed directly to the effect of uncertainty on fairness.
The policies we obtain are qualitatively and quantitatively
different when we consider uncertainty (by being Bayesian)
compared to when we do not.
The Bayesian algorithms we develop, based on gradient
descent, take into account uncertainty by considering fair-
ness with respect to the DM’s information. This inherent
modeling of uncertainty allows us to select better policies
when those policies influence the data we collect, and thus
our knowledge about the model. This is an important infor-
mational feedback effect, that a Bayesian methodology can
provide in a principled way. We provide experimental re-
sults on the COMPAS dataset [Larson et al., 2016] as well
as artificial data, showing the robustness of the Bayesian ap-
proach, and comparing against methods that define fairness
measures according to a single, marginalized model (e.g.
[Hardt, Price, and Srebro, 2016]). While we mainly treat the
non-sequential setting, where the data is fixed, we can also
accommodate sequential, bandits-style settings, as explained
in Sections The Sequential setting and Sequential allocation.
The results provide a vivid illustration of what can go wrong
with a certainty-equivalent approach to achieving fairness.
All missing proofs and details can be found in our supple-
mentary materials.
Related work. Recently algorithmic fairness has been
studied quite extensively in the context of statistical de-
cision making. But we are not aware of work that adopts
a Bayesian perspective. For instance, [Dwork et al.,
2012; Chouldechova, 2016; Corbett-Davies et al.,
2017; Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 2016;
Kilbertus et al., 2017] studied fairness under the one-shot
statistical decision making framework. [Jabbari et al., 2016;
Joseph et al., 2016] kicked off the study of fairness in
sequential decision making settings. Besides, there is also a
trending line of research on fairness in other machine learn-
ing topics, such as clustering [Chierichetti et al., 2017], natu-
ral language processing [Blodgett and O’Connor, 2017] and
recommendation systems [Celis and Vishnoi, 2017]. While
the aforementioned works focused on fairness in a specific
context, such as classification, [Corbett-Davies et al., 2017]
have considered how to satisfy some of the above fairness
constraints while maximizing expected utility. For a given
model, they find a decision rule that maximizes expected
utility while satisfying fairness constraints. [Dwork et al.,
2012] consider an individual-fairness approach, and look
for decision rules that are smooth in a sense that similar
individuals are treated similarly. Finally, we’d like to
mention the recent work of [Russell et al., 2017], which
considers the problem of uncertainty from the point of view
of causal modeling, with the three main differences being (a)
They consider a PAC-like setting, rather than the Bayesian
framework; (b) We show that the effect of uncertainty
remains important even without varying the counterfactual
assumptions, which is the main focus of that paper; (c) the
Bayesian framework easily admits a sequential setting.
In this paper, we focus on notions of fairness related to
notions of conditional independence, discussed next.
Preliminaries
[Chouldechova, 2016] considers the problem of fair predic-
tion with disparate impact. She defines an action2 a as test-
fair with respect to the outcome y and the sensitive variable
z if y is independent of z under the action and parameter θ,
i.e. if y ⊥ z | a, θ. While the author does not explicitly dis-
cuss the distribution Pθ, it is implicitly assumed to be that of
the true model. We slightly generalize it as follows:
Definition 1 (Calibrated decision rule). A decision rule
π(a | x) is calibrated with respect to some distribution Pθ
if y, z are independent for all actions a taken, i.e. if
P πθ (y, z | a) = P
π
θ (y | a)P
π
θ (z | a), (2)
where P πθ is the distribution induced by Pθ and the decision
rule π.
[Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 2016] also con-
sider two balance conditions, which we re-interpret as fol-
lows:
Definition 2 (Balanced decision rule). A decision rule 3
π(a | x) is balanced with respect to some distribution Pθ
if a, z are independent for all y, i.e. if
P πθ (a, z | y) = P
π
θ (a | y)P
π
θ (z | y), (3)
where P πθ is the distribution induced by Pθ and the decision
rule π.
These authors also work with the true model, while we
will slightly generalize the definition, stating balance with
respect to any model parameter.
Unfortunately, the calibration and balanced conditions
cannot be achieved simultaneously for non-trivial environ-
ments [Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 2016]. This
is also true for our more general definitions, as we show
in Theorem 3 in the Supplementary material. From a prac-
titioner’s perspective, we must choose either the calibration
condition or the balanced conditions in order to find a fair de-
cision rule. We work with the balanced condition, because it
gracefully degrades to settings with uncertainty. In particu-
lar, balance involves equality in the expectation of a score
2Called a “statistic” in their paper.
3Here we simplified the notation of the decision rule so that
π(a | x) corresponds to the probability of taking action a given
observation x.
β θ
z x
y u
a π
Figure 1: The basic Bayesian decision problem with obser-
vations x, outcome y, action a, sensitive variable z, utility
u, unknown parameter θ, belief β and policy π. The joint
distribution of x, y, z is fully determined by the unknown
parameter θ, while the conditional distribution of actions a
given observations x is given by the selected policy π. The
DM’s utility function is u, while the fairness of the policy
depends on the problem parameters.
function (when writing the probabilities as the expectations
of 0-1 score functions; also depending on an observation
x) under different values of a sensitive variable z, condi-
tioned on the true (but latent) outcome y. Consequently, bal-
ance can always be satisfied—by using a trivial, for exam-
ple randomized decision rule, being independent of x. The
same, however, does not hold for the calibration condition
under model uncertainty. Note that there also exist other fair-
ness notions that go beyond disparate treatment [Zafar et al.,
2017]. This merits future studies, and is out of the scope of
the current draft.
Bayesian Formulation
We first introduce a concrete, statistical decision problem.
The true (latent) outcome y is generated independently of the
DM’s decision, with a probability distribution that depends
on the available information x. There also exists a sensitive
attribute variable z, which may be dependent on x.4
Definition 3 (Statistical decision problem). See Figure 1 for
the decision diagram. The DM observes x ∈ X , then takes
a decision a ∈ A and obtains utility u(y, a) depending on a
true (latent) outcome y ∈ Y generated from some distribu-
tion Pθ(y | x). The DM has a belief β ∈ B in the form of
a probability distribution on parameters θ ∈ Θ on a family
P , {Pθ(y | x) | θ ∈ Θ } of distributions. In the Bayesian
case, the belief β is a posterior formed through a prior and
available data. The DMhas a utility function u : Y×A → R,
with utility depending on the DM’s action and the outcome.
For simplicity, we will assume thatX ,A, andY , are finite
and discrete, whereasΘ will be a subset ofRn. We focus on
Bayesian decision rules, i.e. rules whose decisions depend
upon a posterior belief β. The Bayes-optimal decision rule
for a given posterior and utility, but ignoring fairness, is de-
fined below.
Definition 4 (Bayes-optimal decision rule). The Bayes-
optimal decision rule π∗ : B × X → A is a deterministic
policy that maximizes the utility in expectation, i.e. takes
action π∗(β, x) ∈ argmaxa∈A uβ(a | x), with uβ(a |
4Depending on the application scenario, z may actually be a
subset of x and thus directly observable, while in other scenarios
it may be latent. Here we focus on the case where z is not directly
observed.
x) ,
∑
y u(y, a)Pβ (y | x), where Pβ (y | x) ,
∫
Θ
Pθ(y |
x) dβ(θ) is the marginal distribution over outcomes condi-
tional on the observations according to the DM’s belief β.
The Bayes-optimal decision rule does not directly depend
on the sensitive variable z. We are interested in operating
over multiple time periods. At time t, the DM observes xt
and makes a decision at using policy πt and obtains some
instantaneous payoff Ut = u(yt, at) and fairness violation
Ft. As always, the DM’s utility is the sum of instantaneous
payoffs over time, U ,
∑T
t=1 u(yt, at) and she is interested
in finding a policy maximising U in expectation. Note the
decision problem and its variables stay unchanged over time.
Although the Bayes-optimal decision rule brings the high-
est expected reward to the DM, it may be unfair. In the se-
quel, we will define analogs of the balance notion of fairness
in terms of decision rules π, and investigate appropriate de-
cision rules, that possibly result in randomized policies. In
particular, we shall consider a utility function that combines
the DM’s utility with the societal benefit due to fairness, and
search for the Bayes-optimal decision rules with respect to
this new, combined utility.
In particular, we define a Bayesian analogue of the maxi-
mization problem defined in (1):
max
π
(1− λ)Eπβ u− λE
π
β f
=max
π
∫
Θ
[(1− λ)Eπθ u− λE
π
θ f ] dβ(θ). (4)
To make this concrete, in the sequel we shall define the ap-
propriate Bayesian version of the fairness-as-balance condi-
tion.
Bayesian Balance
In the Bayesian setting, we would like our decisions to take
into account the impact on all possible models. While per-
fect balance is generally achievable, it turns out that some-
times only a trivial decision rule can satisfy it in a setting
with model uncertainty (where balance must hold exactly,
for all possible model parameters).
Theorem 1. A trivial decision rule of the form π(a | x) =
pa can always satisfy balance for a Bayesian decision prob-
lem. However, it may be the only balanced decision rule,
even when a non-trivial balanced policy can be found for
every possible θ ∈ Θ.
The proof, as well as an example illustrating this result,
are in the supplementary materials. For this reason, we con-
sider the the p-norm of the deviation from fairness with re-
spect to our belief β:
Definition 5 (Bayesian Balance). We say that a decision rule
π(·) is (α, p)-Bayes-balanced with respect to β if:
f(π) ,
∫
Θ
∑
a,y,z
∣∣∣∣∑
x
π(a|x)[Pθ(x, z|y)
− Pθ(x|y)Pθ(z|y)]
∣∣∣∣
p
dβ(θ) ≤ αp. (5)
This definition captures the expected deviation from bal-
ance of policy π, for a Bayesian DM under their belief
β. It measures the deviation of the specific policy π from
perfect balance with respect to each possible parameter θ,
and weighs it according to the probability of that model.
This provides a graceful trade-off between achieving near-
balance in the most likely models, while avoiding extreme
unfairness in less likely ones.
Why not use a single point estimate for the model, instead
of the full Bayesian approach? This would entail simply
measuring balance (and utility) with respect to the marginal
model Pβ ,
∫
Θ
Pθ dβ(θ).
Definition 6 (Marginal balance). A decision rule π(·) is
(α, p)-marginal-Balanced if ∀a, y, z:
∑
a,y,z
∣∣∣∣∑
x
π(a|x) [Pβ(x, z|y)− Pβ(x|y)Pβ(z|y)]
∣∣∣∣
p
≤ α.
(6)
One problem with this, which we will see in our ex-
perimental results, is that the DM would assume that the
marginal model is the correct one, and may be very unfair
towards other high-probability models.
Still, both balance conditions can provide a bound on bal-
ance with respect to the true model. For this, denote the true
underlying model as θ∗, and define the (ǫ, δ)-accurate belief.
Definition 7. We call β(θ) an (ǫ, δ)-accurate belief with re-
spect to the true model θ∗ ∈ Θ, if with β-probability at least
1− δ, ∀x, y, z:
|Pθ(x|y, z)− Pθ∗(x|y, z)| ≤ ǫ, |Pθ(x|y)− Pθ∗(x|y)| ≤ ǫ,
i.e. that set Θǫ for which the above conditions hold has mea-
sure β(Θǫ) ≥ 1− δ.
Under some conditions the balance achieved through ei-
ther definition provides an approximation to balance under
the true model, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If a decision rule satisfies either (α, 1)-
marginal-balance or (α, 1)-Bayes-balance for β or both,
and β is (ǫ, δ)-accurate, then the resulting decision rule is a
(α + 2|A| · |Z| · |Y| · (ǫ+ δ), 1)-balanced
decision rule w.r.t. the true model θ∗.
This theorem says that if our belief β is concentrated
around the true model Pθ∗ , and our decision rule is fair with
respect to either definition, then it is also fair with respect to
the true model.
The Sequential setting
We can extend the approach to a sequential setting, where
the information learned depends on the action. For example,
if we grant a loan application, we will only later discover
if the loan is going to be paid off. This will affect our fu-
ture decisions. Analogous to other sequential decision mak-
ing problems such as Markov decision processes[Puterman,
1994], we need to solve the following optimization problem
over a time horizon T :
max
π
Eβ1
[
T∑
t=1
(1 − λ)Ut − λFt
]
, (7)
where π now must explicitly map future beliefs βt to proba-
bilities over actions. If the data that the DM obtains depends
on her decisions at, then she must consider adaptive policies,
as the next belief depends on what the data obtained by the
policy was.
We can reformulate the maximization problem so as to
explicitly include the future changes in belief:
V ∗(βt) , sup
πt
E
πt
βt
[(1− λ)Ut − λFt]
+
∑
βt+1
V ∗(βt+1)P
πt
βt
(βt+1), (8)
under the mild assumption that the set of reachable next
beliefs is finite (easily satisfied when the set of outcomes
is finite). This formulation is not different from standard
MDP formulation (e.g., the reinforcement learning settings)
that features the trade-offs between exploration (obtaining
new knowledges) and exploitation (maximizing utilities).
We know in these settings a myopic policy will lead to sub-
optimal solutions.
However, just as in the bandits case [c.f. Duff, 2002]), the
above computation is intractable, as the policy space is ex-
ponential in T . For this reason, in this paper we only con-
sider myopic policies that select a policy (and decision) that
is optimal for the current step t, trading utility and fairness
as well as the value of ‘single-step’ information. A specific
instance of this type of sequential version of the problem is
experimentally studied in Section Sequential allocation.
Algorithms
The algorithms we employ in this paper are based on gradi-
ent descent. We compare the full Bayesian framework with
the simpler approach of assuming that the marginal model is
the true one. In particular, for the Bayesian framework, we
directly optimize (4). Using the marginal simplification, we
maximize (1) with respect to the marginal model Pβ .
Balance gradient descent
Again, as in the Bayesian setting, we have a family of mod-
els {Pθ } with a corresponding subjective distribution β(θ).
In order to derive algorithms, we shall focus on the quantity:
C(π, θ) ,
∑
y,z
∥∥∑
x
π(a | x)∆θ(x, y, z)
∥∥
p
, (9)
to be the deviation from balance for decision rule π under
parameter θ, where
∆θ(x, y, z) , Pθ(x, z | y)− Pθ(x | y)Pθ(z | y). (10)
Then the Bayesian balance of the policy is f(π) =∫
Θ
C(π, θ) dβ(θ).
In order to find a rule trading off utility for balance, we
can maximize a convex combination of the expected utility
and deviation specified in (4). In particular, we can look for
a parametrized rule πw solving the following unconstrained
maximization problem.
max
πw
∫
Θ
Vθ(πw) dβ(θ),
Vθ(πw) , (1− λ)E
πw
θ u− λC(πw , θ) (11)
To perform this maximization we use parametrized policies
and stochastic gradient descent. In particular, for a finite set
X and Y , the policies can be defined in terms of parameters
wxa = π(a | x). Then we can perform stochastic gradient
descent as detailed in Section Gradient calculations for op-
timal balance decision of supplementary materials, by sam-
pling θ ∼ β and calculating the gradient for each sampled
θ.
For the marginal decision rule, we employ the same ap-
proach, but instead of sampling the parameters from the pos-
terior, we use the parameters of the marginal model. The
approach is otherwise identical.
Experiments
In this section we study the utility-fairness trade-off on ar-
tificial and real data sets. We compare our approach, which
uses a decision rule based on the full Bayesian problem, to
classical approaches such as Hardt, Price, and Srebro [2016]
which simply optimizes the DM’s policy with respect to
a single model. Rather than introducing a new fairness
metric, we use a generalized version of the balance met-
ric in Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan [2016], which
is also a generalization of the equality of opportunity in
Hardt, Price, and Srebro [2016]. We see that the Bayesian
approach very gracefully handles fairness, even with high
model uncertainty, while a marginal approach can be bla-
tantly unfair. For a fair comparison, in both cases we assume
the same prior distribution for the parameters. We focus on a
simple model where posterior distributions can be calculated
in closed-form, in order to focus on the choice of policy,
rather than the case with approximate inference. However,
our algorithm is generally applicable and could be combined
with e.g. MCMC inference.
Performance is evaluated with respect to actual balance
and utility achieved: for the synthetic data this will be mea-
sured according to the actual data-generating distribution,
while for the COMPAS data, it will be the empirical distri-
bution on a holdout set.
The algorithm for optimising policies uses (stochastic)
gradient descent. In particular, the Bayesian policy mini-
mizes (5) by sampling θ from the posterior distribution β
and then taking a step in the gradient direction. The marginal
policy simply performs steepest gradient descent for the
marginal model.
The results shown in Figures 2–5 display the perfor-
mance of the corresponding (Bayesian or marginal) decision
rule for different value of λ as more data is acquired. In the
first two experiments, we assume that no matter what the
decision of the DM is, zt, yt are always observed after the
DM’s decision and so the model is fully updated. In that
setting, it is not necessary for the DM to take into account
expected future information for her actions. However, in the
third experiment, described in Section Sequential allocation,
the values of zt and yt are only observed when the DM
makes the decision at = 1, and the DM faces a generalized
exploration problem.
The model we employ throughout is a discrete Bayesian
network model, with finite X ,Y,Z,A. The models are thus
described through multinomial distributions that capture the
dependency between different random variables. The avail-
able data is used to calculate a posterior distribution β(θ).
From this, we calculate both an approximate marginal bal-
anced rule as well as a Bayesian balanced rule. The for-
mer uses the marginal model directly, while the latter uses
k = 16 samples from the posterior distribution.5 We tested
these approaches both on synthetic data and on the COM-
PAS dataset. The conjugate prior distribution to this model
is a simple Dirichlet-product, as the network is discrete. The
graphical model is fully connected, so the model uses the
factorization Pθ(x, y, z) = Pθ(y | x, z)Pθ(x | z)Pθ(z). We
used this simple modeling choice throughout the paper, apart
from the small experiment on synthetic data in the following
section. In all cases where a Dirichlet prior was used, the
Dirichlet prior parameters were all set equal to 1/2.
Experiments on synthetic data.
Here we consider a discrete decision problem, with |X | = 8,
|Y| = |Z| = |A| = 2, and u(y, a) = I {y = a}. In our first
experiment, we generate 100 observations from this model.
We performed the experiment 10 times, each time generating
data from a fully connected discrete Bayesian network with
uniformly randomly selected parameters. Unlike the rest of
the paper, in this example, the prior distribution has finite
support on only 8 models. This means that the posterior will
have effectively converged to the true model after 100 obser-
vations.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the relative performance of the
Bayesian approach w.r.t. the marginal approach increases as
we put more emphasis on fairness (Figure 2 (a) cares noth-
ing about fairness.). In some cases (e.g. Figure 2 (c)), value
for the marginal approach decreases at the beginning and
eventually reaches the same value as the Bayesian approach
after sufficient amount of data is received. This conforms
with our hypothesis that one should take into account model
uncertainty. The fact that both approaches converge toward
the maximum value is in accordance with our formal results
(Theorem 2).
Finally, Figure 3 and its extended version (Figure 6 in sup-
plementary materials) more clearly shows how well the two
different solutions performwith respect to the utility fairness
trade-off. As we vary λ and the amount of data, both meth-
ods achieve the same utility. However the Bayesian approach
consistently achieves lower fairness violations for similar U .
5We found empirically that 16 was a sufficient number for sta-
ble behaviour and efficient computation. For k = 1 the algorithm
devolves into an approximation of Thompson sampling.
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Figure 2: Synthetic data. Test of effect of amount of data for Bayesian versus marginal decision rules, for different values of
the λ parameter, with respect to the true model. As more weight is placed on guaranteeing fairness, we see that the Bayesian
approach is better able to guarantee fairness for the true model. The plots show the average performance over 10 runs, with an
initially uniform prior over a set of 8 models, one of which is the correct one. In this setting |A| = |Y| = |Z| = 2 and |X | = 8.
Experiments on COMPAS data.
For the COMPAS dataset, we consider a discretization
where fields such as the number of offenses are converted
to binary features.6 We used the first 6000 data points for
training and the remaining 1214 points for validation. Two
attributes are sensitive (sex, race), while 6 attributes (relat-
ing to prior convictions and age) are used for the policy.
With discretization, there are a total of 12 distinct values
for the sensitive attributes and 141 for the observables used
for the underlying model. The prediction is whether or not
there is recidivism in the next two years, with utility function
u(a, y) = I {a = y}.
Figure 4 and its extended version (Figure 7 in supplemen-
tary materials) show the results of applying our analysis to
the COMPAS dataset used by ProPublica. Since in this case
the true model was unknown, the results are calculated with
respect to the marginal model estimated on the holdout set.
In this scenario we can see that when we only focus on clas-
sification performance, the marginal and Bayesian decision
rules perform equally well. However, as we place more em-
phasis on fairness, we observe that the Bayesian approach
dominates. 7
6We arrived at the specific discretization through cross validat-
ing the performance of a discrete Bayesian classifier over possible
discretizations.
7We note here that measured performance performance may not
monotonically increase with respect to the (rather small) holdout
Sequential allocation.
Here the DM, at each time t observes xt and has a choice of
actions at ∈ {0, 1}. The action both predicts yt ∈ {0, 1}
and has the following side-effect: the DM only observes
yt, zt after he makes the choice at = 1, otherwise only xt.
The utility is not directly observed by the DM, and is mea-
sured against the empirical model in the holdout set, as be-
fore. We use the same COMPAS dataset, and the results are
broadly similar, apart from the fact that the Bayesian deci-
sion rule appears to remain robust in this setting, while the
marginal one’s performance degrades. We presume that this
is because that the Bayesian decision rule explicitly taking
into account uncertainty leads to more robust performance
relative to the marginal decision rule, which does not. The
results are shown in Figure 5 and its extended version (Fig-
ure 8 in supplementary materials). The larger discrepancy
between for the Bayesian case in Figure 5(a) implies that
explicitly modelling uncertainty is also crucial for utility in
this case.
Conclusion and future directions
Existing fairness criteria may be hard to satisfy or verify in a
learning setting because they are defined for the true model.
set. Even if we had converged to the true model, measuring with
respect to an empirical estimate is problematic, as it will be ǫ-far
away from the true model. This is particularly important for fair-
ness considerations.
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Figure 3: Synthetic data, utility-fairness trade-off. This plot is generated from the same data as Figure 2. However, now we
are plotting the utility and fairness of each individual policy separately. In all cases, it can be seen that the Bayesian policy
achieves the same utility as the non-Bayesian policy, while achieving a lower fairness violation.
100 101 102
0.5
0.6
0.7
t× 10
V
(a) λ = 0
100 101 102
−1
−0.5
0
t× 10
(b) λ = 0.5
100 101 102
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
t× 10
(c) λ = 1
Bayes
Marginal
(d) legend
Figure 4: COMPAS dataset. Demonstration of balance on the COMPAS dataset. The plots show the value measured on the
holdout set for the Bayes andMarginal balance. Figures (a-c) show the utility achieved under different choices of λ as we we
observe each of the 6,000 training data points. Utility and fairness are measured on the empirical distribution of the remaining
data and it can be seen that the Bayesian approach dominates as soon as fairness becomes important, i.e. λ > 0.
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Figure 5: Sequential allocation. Performance measured with respect to the empirical model of the holdout COMPAS data,
when the DM’s actions affect which data will be seen. This means that whenever a prisoner was not released, then the dependent
variable y will remain unseen. For that reason, the performance of the Bayesian approach dominates the classical approach even
when fairness is not an issue, i.e. λ = 0.
For that reason, we develop a Bayesian fairness framework,
which deals explicitly with the information available to the
decision maker. Our framework allows us to more ade-
quately incorporate uncertainty into fairness considerations.
We believe that a further exploration of the informational
aspects of fairness, and in particular for sequential decision
problems in the Bayesian setting, will be extremely fruitful.
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Supplementary materials for “Bayesian Fairness”
Impossibility result
Theorem 3. Calibration and balance conditions cannot hold simultaneously, except: (i) if there exists perfect decision rules
that there exists a, y s.t. P πθ (y | a) = 0 or P
π
θ (a | y) = 0, or (ii) z is independent of y that for each z, P
π
θ (z|y) ≡ const., ∀y.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Using Bayes rule we first have
P πθ (a, z | y) = P
π
θ (y, z | a) ·
P πθ (a | y)
P πθ (y | a)
. (12)
Suppose calibration condition holds, that is
P πθ (y, z | a) = P
π
θ (y | a)P
π
θ (z | a)
Plug above into Eqn. (12) we have
P πθ (a, z | y) = P
π
θ (y | a)P
π
θ (z | a) ·
P πθ (a | y)
P πθ (y | a)
= P πθ (z | a) · P
π
θ (a | y).
On the other hand, if balanced condition holds too, we have
P πθ (a, z | y) = P
π
θ (a | y) · P
π
θ (z | y)
Together we have that
P πθ (z | a) · P
π
θ (a | y) = P
π
θ (a | y) · P
π
θ (z | y)→ P
π
θ (z | a) = P
π
θ (z | y),
which does not hold when condition (ii) does not hold, completing the proof.
Trivial decision rules for balance
Theorem 4. A trivial decision rule of the form π(a | x) = pa can always satisfy balance for a Bayesian decision problem.
However, it may be the only balanced decision rule, even when a non-trivial balanced policy can be found for every possible
θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. For the first part, notice that Eqn. (3) can be always satisfied trivially if π(a | x) = pa, i.e. we ignore the observations
when taking our actions. For the second part, we can rewrite Eqn. (3) as∑
x
π(a|x) [Pθ(x, z|y)− Pθ(x|y)Pθ(z|y)] = 0
∑
x
π(a|x)∆θ(x, y, z) = 0,
where the ∆ term is only dependent on the parameters. This condition can be satisfied in two ways: the first is if the model θ
makes x, z conditionally independent on y. The second is if the vector π(a | ·) is orthogonal to ∆θ(·, y, z). If |X | > |Y × Z|,
then, for any θ, we can always find a policy vector π(a | ·) that is orthogonal to all vectors∆θ(·, y, z). However, if these vectors
across θ have exactly degree of freedom being 1 (since they add up to 0, thus the rank of them can be at most the full rank - 1),
then no single policy can be orthogonal to all, as otherwise the degree of freedom for this set of vectors will be at least 2.
EXAMPLE 1. In this balance example, there are two models. In the first model, for some value y, we have:
Pθ(x = 0|y) = 1/4, Pθ(x = 0|y, z = 1) = 1/4− ǫ, (13)
Pθ(x = 1|y) = 1/4, Pθ(x = 1|y, z = 1) = 1/4 + ǫ, (14)
Pθ(x = 2|y) = 1/4, Pθ(x = 2|y, z = 1) = 1/4 + ǫ, (15)
(16)
so that
Pθ(x = 0|y) − Pθ(x = 0|y, z = 1) = ǫ, (17)
Pθ(x = 1|y) − Pθ(x = 1|y, z = 1) = −ǫ (18)
Pθ(x = 2|y) − Pθ(x = 2|y, z = 1) = −ǫ (19)
Similarly, we can construct models θ′ and θ′′ so that the corresponding differences are (−ǫ, ǫ,−ǫ) and (ǫ, ǫ,−ǫ). For any policy π(a | x)
consider the vector πa = (π(a = 1 | x))
3
x=1. Note that we can make the policy orthogonal to the first model simply by setting πa =
(1/2, 1/2, 1).
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We show the proof for Bayes-balance condition, while the proof for Marginal-balance resembles similarities. Denote the
(1 − δ)-event that θ drawn from β(θ) that is ǫ close to the true model θ∗ in all the conditional probabilities Pθ(x|y, z), Pθ(x|y)
as E , then we have: ∣∣∑
x
π(a|x) [Pθ∗(x, z|y)− Pθ∗(x|y)Pθ∗(z|y)]
∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
θ∈E
∑
x
π(a|x) [Pθ∗(x, z|y)− Pθ∗(x|y)Pθ∗(z|y)]
+
∫
θ/∈E
∑
x
π(a|x) [Pθ∗(x, z|y)− Pθ∗(x|y)Pθ∗(z|y)]
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
θ∈E
∑
x
π(a|x) [Pθ(x, z|y)− Pθ(x|y)Pθ(z|y)] + 2ǫ
+
∫
θ/∈E
∑
x
π(a|x) [Pθ∗(x, z|y)− Pθ(x|y)Pθ(z|y)] + 2δ
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∑
x
π(a|x)
∫
Θ
[Pθ(x, z|y)− Pθ(x|y)Pθ(z|y)]
∣∣+ 2(ǫ+ δ).
Summing over all a, y, z gives us the results.
Gradient calculations for optimal balance decision
For simplicity, let us define the vector in PA:
cw(y, z) =
∑
x
πw(· | x)∆(x, y, z),
so that
fλ(w) = u(β, πw)− λ
∑
y,z
cw(y, z)
⊤cw(y, z).
Now
∇w
(
cw(y, z)
⊤cw(y, z)
)
= ∇w
∑
a
cw(y, z)
2
a
=
∑
a
2cw(y, z)a∇wcw(y, z)a
∇wcw(y, z)a =
∑
x
∇wπw(a | x)∆(x, y, z),
while
∇u(β, πw) =
∫
X
dPβ(x)∇wπw(a | x)Eβ(u | x, a) (20)
Combining the two terms, we have
∇wfλ(w) =
∫
X
∇wπw(a | x)
[
dPβ(x)Eβ(U | x, a)
− 2λ
∑
y,z
cw(y, z)a∆(x, y, z) dΛ(x),
]
.
where Λ is the Lebesgue measure. We now derive the gradient for the∇wπw term. We consider two parameterizations.
Independent policy parameters. When π(a | x) = wax, we obtain
∂π(a′ | x′)/∂ax = I {ax = a′x′}
. This unfortunately requires projecting the policy parameters back to the simplex. For this reason, it might be better to use a
parameterization that allows unconstrained optimization.
Softmax policy parameters. When
π(a | x) = ewax/
∑
a′
ewa′x ,
we have the following gradients:
∂π(a | x)/∂ax = ewax
∑
a′ 6=a
ewa′x
(∑
a′
ewa′x
)−2
∂π(a | x)/∂a′x = ewax+wa′x
(∑
a′′
ewa′′x
)−2
, a 6= a′
∂π(a | x)/∂a′x′ = 0, ax 6= a′x′.
Empirical formulation.
For infinite X , it may be more efficient to rewrite (??) as
0 =
∫
X
π(a | x) d [P (x, z | y)− P (x | y)P (z | y)] (21)
=
∫
X
π(a | x) [P (z | y, x)− P (z | y)] dP (x | y) (22)
=
∫
X
π(a | x) [P (z | y, x)− P (z | y)]
P (y | x)
P (y)
dP (x) (23)
≈
∑
x∼Pθ(x)
π(a | x) [P (z | y, x)− P (z | y)]
P (y | x)
P (y)
(24)
simplifying by dropping the P (y) term:
0 ≈
∑
x∼Pθ(x)
π(a | x) [P (z | y, x)− P (z | y)]P (y | x), (25)
This allows us to approximate the integral by sampling x, and can be useful for e.g. regression problems.
Complete figures
This section has complete versions of the figures which could not fit in the main text.
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Figure 6: Synthetic data, utility-fairness trade-off. This plot is generated from the same data as Figure 2. However, now we
are plotting the utility and fairness of each individual policy separately. In all cases, it can be seen that the Bayesian policy
achieves the same utility as the non-Bayesian policy, while achieving a lower fairness violation.
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Figure 7: COMPAS dataset. Demonstration of balance on the COMPAS dataset. The plots show the value measured on the
holdout set for the Bayes andMarginal balance. Figures (a-e) show the utility achieved under different choices of λ as we we
observe each of the 6,000 training data points. Utility and fairness are measured on the empirical distribution of the remaining
data and it can be seen that the Bayesian approach dominates as soon as fairness becomes important, i.e. λ > 0.
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Figure 8: Sequential allocation. Performance measured with respect to the empirical model of the holdout COMPAS data,
when the DM’s actions affect which data will be seen. This means that wif a prisoner was not released, then the dependent
variable y will remain unseen. For that reason, the performance of the Bayesian approach dominates the classical approach
even when fairness is not an issue, i.e. λ = 0.
